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There is no ‘happily ever after’ in geopolitics. India understands that there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests, and multi-alignment is how it secures them
The power differential between India and China would keep the United States relevant in the Indian scheme of things, because balancing China is not a choice, it is a compulsion.
Miles away in Kazan, a culturally, politically, and economically significant city in Russia’s Tatarstan, an Indian Prime Minister met a Chinese President for the first time in five years this week. Geopolitics is often unpredictable, yet this development was only partially surprising, as it was an anticipated move both countries knew would eventually occur.
The last time the two leaders met was at an informal summit in Mamallapuram, in southern India, in 2019, just months before the countries clashed in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020. While the world was grappling with the effects of a once-in-a-century pandemic, China launched a brutal assault on Indian soldiers in Galwan Valley, where 20 Indian troops lost their lives. This incident shattered the 1993 Peace and Tranquillity Agreement signed to maintain the status quo and peace at the border. It was also the first time in 45 years that blood had been shed in a China-India border conflict; the last such instance was in 1975, when four Indian soldiers were ambushed at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh.
The Galwan Valley incident changed a significant reality that India had come to take for granted—peace at the border with China had become a daily assumption. To be fair, there were frequent Chinese incursions—hundreds, in fact—but at least no lives were lost in resolving the resulting standoffs.
Since 2020, relations between India and China had gone into a deep freeze. First came India’s diplomatic response with serious condemnation, followed by rallying support from its Indo-Pacific partners, and then a complete halt to economic cooperation, marked by a blanket ban on Chinese investments. In the post-Galwan period, India suspended over 30 dialogue processes with China, including high-level discussions such as strategic dialogues between foreign ministers, the annual defence dialogue, meetings of special representatives on the territorial dispute, as well as youth exchanges, media, and think-tank dialogues. Relations reached their lowest point in this century, with the Indian side reiterating on various occasions that ties with China were far from normal.
Fast forward to October 2024, and we see Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi holding a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia. The meeting though is a natural progression following a key announcement earlier in the week by both countries on completing the disengagement process at the border, effectively returning the situation to how it was in 2020. Interestingly, the meeting has sparked a sense that India is once again warming to China, with a picture of PM Modi, President Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping circulating online, fuelling the belief that Russia-India-China camaraderie is not that dead after all.
These sentiments are further fuelled by what India has faced from the West in recent weeks. This includes coordinated efforts to target India with unfounded allegations of government-backed assassinations on Canadian and American soil. If Canada, under Justin Trudeau, has tried to blame India for ‘interference’, then the United States has also initiated action against what it calls the conspirators of a plot to assassinate Khalistani Gurpatwant Singh Panun. In fact, a serious geopolitics expert would not deny that what transpired at the BRICS summit was, in part, a response to the West’s attempts to corner India over the Khalistan issue.
The optics of PM Modi showing a thumbs-up sign in the company of Putin and Xi were unmissable. It almost seemed like India was reminding the West that it has alternative alliances to pursue if its interests are not respected. In fact, over the past year, the West—led by the US—has behaved more like a strategic foe than a strategic partner. The only time when India and the United States shared a little warmth in relations was during PM Modi’s state visit in September this year. Otherwise, whether through the tacit backing of Khalistani terrorists against India or the regime change in Bangladesh to unseat pro-India Hasina, Indian interests have been thrown out of the window by our so-called ‘strategic partner’, the West.
However, concluding that India’s tilt towards the West is over and that it will now firmly pursue a Russia-India-China trilateral alignment would be inaccurate. Firstly, despite the resolution of the border standoff and the recent bilateral meeting between the two leaders, the systemic reality of India-China relations remains unchanged.
China, for all practical purposes, has a massive power asymmetry over India, and its current conciliatory behaviour is an exception, not the norm. It has internalised the lesson of what followed after the Galwan Valley attack very well. India’s westward shift has made it realise its own folly in alienating one of the biggest emerging markets in the world today. This assumes greater significance in light of the economic woes that China is currently facing. But at the same time, the power differential between India and China would keep the United States relevant in the Indian scheme of things, because balancing China is not a choice, it is a compulsion.
Even before Galwan, the Modi government was steadily pursuing a close relationship with the West, as evident in the revival of the Quad, the signing of foundational military agreements, and recognising the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a joint strategic region.
For the West also, the Khalistan issue is a plank to arm-twist India into submission – the proverbial “stick” in the “carrot and stick” approach. Yet, the reality is that India is uniquely positioned to be the lynchpin of their Indo-Pacific strategies. Only India can firmly help in balancing China, serving as an effective counterweight. India, in its own right, is an alluring partner, with strong undercurrents of trade, investment, and technological cooperation, particularly given its status as the fastest-growing major economy. Even if a condescending candidate like Kamala Harris comes to power, the US would still like to court India, because the corporate America is too greedy to ignore the Indian market. Not to forget the promise of India as a market for large arms imports.
So, all in all, relations with the West are unlikely to falter in the long run. As for the long-term potential of India-China relations, one has no hope except to be at their cautious best.
Since these two ancient civilisations emerged as modern countries in the late 1940s, one constant in China’s behaviour has been its propensity to dishonour agreements. This pattern began with Panchsheel in 1954 and continues to this day. There is nothing to suggest that China will behave more responsibly, especially given its vast power asymmetry with India.
So, what is the key takeaway from the Modi-Xi meeting? It is a recognition of the fact that India is deploying multiple strategies to secure its interests until it rises as a formidable great power on its own.
In the game of geopolitics, you sometimes have to choose stable relations with your enemy to focus on building your own strength. As long as China allows India this space, there is scope for dialogue. But should it resort to another Galwan-like attack, India always has the option of strengthening ties with the West. This cycle will continue, as diplomacy is often ‘business as usual.’
Meanwhile, the trick is to keep developing border infrastructure, build India’s manufacturing prowess and bolster its military. Only from a position of strength can India negotiate effectively on the global stage—no strategy alone can achieve that. Remember, India is just one major border standoff away from cutting off dialogue with China again and only one sensible American President away from a warmer relationship with the West. Geopolitics has no finality; there is no “happily ever after.” Only interests are permanent, which India has been chasing quite successfully through PM Modi’s multi-alignment policy.
The author is a New Delhi-based commentator on geopolitics and foreign policy. She holds a PhD from the Department of International Relations, South Asian University. She tweets @TrulyMonica. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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October 26, 2024, 17:35 IST
News opinion Opinion | The Art Of Multi-Alignment: India’s Dance Of Diplomacy With China And The West