With air power acquiring renewed focus because of Operation Sindoor, it is encouraging to note that the first HAL Nashik-produced LCA-Mk-1A is all set to make its maiden flight in mid-July.
Concurrently, this is an appropriate time to recall the sage counsel of the Air Chief Marshal (ACM) A P Singh regarding the systemic challenges that constrain India’s atmanirbhar effort in this domain.
Addressing the Confederation of Indian Industry summit recently, ACM Singh expressed concern over the long delays in delivery schedules of major platforms, noting: “Timeline is a big issue. Not a single project that I can think of has been completed on time. This is something we have to look at. Why should we promise something which cannot be achieved? While signing the contract itself, sometimes we are sure that it is not going to come up, but we just sign the contract.”
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has been grappling with the challenge of obsolescence and depleting inventory with its fighter aircraft for decades and this issue has been flagged by successive air chiefs to the government of the day. But no one has been as explicit in belling the cat as ACM Singh; his constructive candour is commendable.
The onus for these prolonged delays in delivering combat aircraft to the customer — the IAF in this case — lies with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, which has a monopoly in the defence aviation sector. The primary customer has been rendered captive and the most glaring delay is the LCA (light combat aircraft) Tejas. This project began in the early 1980s with the setting up of the ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency) under the aegis of the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) to replace the Soviet origin MiG aircraft of 1960s vintage.
The design and manufacture of a modern fighter aircraft is a complex and onerous project and most nations that have acquired this capability have taken decades with considerable investment in the ecosystem required for this endeavour. India followed the same track and the first indigenously built aircraft was inducted into the Air Force in 2015 — that is three decades later and the combat efficiency is yet to be proven.
However, the IAF has raised concerns over the delivery schedule of the 83 Tejas Mk-1A which HAL had promised to supply and this was flagged by ACM Singh at the Bengaluru air show in February this year. At that time, the CAS expressed his “no confidence” in HAL and added: “I was assured that by February, 11 Mk1As would be ready except for the engines. Not even one is ready yet.”
At Bengaluru, the CAS also acknowledged that the inadequacies were “systemic” and not the fault of individuals and held out an olive branch, when he noted: “I cannot single out anyone because the responsibility falls on all of us.” It is evident that whatever efforts the IAF may have made in the past, it found itself in a catch-22 situation: No credible indigenous fighter aircraft being delivered on time by HAL and no viable option available to import these platforms due to the government push to adhere to atmanirbharta.
Yet, to its credit, the IAF rose to the occasion during Operation Sindoor despite these constraints and at the CII Summit, the CAS highlighted the centrality of air power in the composite national military capability.
India is woefully inadequate in this domain and the systemic lapses begin at the very top — in the higher defence matrix of the country — represented by the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security). Notwithstanding the stellar success of a modest but indigenously designed fighter aircraft — the HF 24 Marut — that was rolled out from HAL in the early 1960s (thanks to a German designer Karl Tank), the higher defence management lattice was unable to prevail upon the “system” (represented by the political apex, the defence ministry, the IAF and the HAL) to pursue the indigenous design path, in the manner that the Indian Navy did.
HAL marched to its own beat, sans accountability and was unable to forge a synergistic atmanirbhar-oriented relationship with its principal customer, the IAF. The political apex was indifferent to this stasis and the client was driven into a supplier-monopoly cul-de-sac, wherein the import option became the default choice. This ensured that India’s combat aircraft were assembled in the main — and this was trumpeted as an indigenous achievement. Progressive manufacturing of imported designs (largely Soviet/Russian origin) took root but genuine indigenous design effort languished. The fact that India is still dependent on an imported aero-engine for its LCA and other platforms is illustrative.
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R&D lies at the heart of a viable and modern indigenous design capability as the CAS highlighted and needs sustained investment from the government, complemented by private sector and academia. Tangible fiscal support is vital and the Indian investment is well below the median. The Global Investment Index estimated 2023 R&D spending (in US $ billions) as follows: USA: 784, China: 723, Japan: 184, India: 71.
The first systemic issue that needs attention is to increase national R&D to reach a more substantial figure and for this to happen — the prevailing strategic culture apropos of national security must undergo a radical transmutation — with lesser emphasis on optics that are driven by electoral politics and an investment in institutional integrity and proven technological competence.
India’s quest for atmanirbharta will be shaped by its ability to reach world-class design standards in niche high-tech sectors. ACM Singh did his duty — his svadharma — by pointing to the tip of a murky iceberg. The onus is on the rest of the system to heed his sage advice and apply the necessary policy correctives. The alternative is bleak and the much vaunted Indian strategic autonomy will remain a mirage.
The writer is director, Society for Policy Studies